Note: In the aftermath of the bloody hostage-taking drama at the Luneta, friend Cesar Aquino wanted my views on SWAT.
August 28
Dear Sar: This is to respond to your text re SWAT, Philippine-style.
The modern army has always had special operations groups trained and utilized for non-traditional, paramilitary purposes. The American Era Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the Philippine Scouts may have been, in today’s usage, Special Ops. The PC was actually a national police force with military training and equipment, while the Scouts were originally composed of surrenderees from the indigenous tribes, whose main job was to acquaint the invaders with locations and personnel in the invaded country. This was the situation in The Firewalkers.
In the 1950s, American strategic interests in the Far East was such that they maneuvered the creation, and largely trained the Philippine Army Scout Rangers, commanded by Rocky Ileto, to do counter insurgency operations. At the same time, Napoleon Valeriano led the Nenita Unit, composed of the internationally-famous 10th BCT and two other battalions, whose unpleasant methods were the terror of the Visayas region. I saw the Nenita at work and play in Cavite when I was a boy, but by that time they had become a PR unit: on their battle trucks, they fetched drums of precious fresh water for the townspeople of Mendez, showed propaganda movies, played basketball at the town plaza against our local Sabre Jets, with Carmen Rosales – Valeriano’s rumored sweetheart – as the Nenita’s backlit, auburn-haloed muse.
Then, the Philippine Constabulary was a department of the AFP. It was the force called upon 1) for problems too big for municipal police forces, such as insurgencies, etc., but, mainly 2) as the central government’s counter-balance designed to whip down local executives whose police forces became too big and began operating as private armies. Late in the Marcos era, the PC became by law the PC-Integrated National Police, and was later again spun out as a purely civilian bureau under the Department of Interior. By legal fiat, all of today’s Philippine policemen are civilians like you and me.
Which brings us to the American invention called SWAT. American police are civilian units and were, for most of their history, well served with civilian, primarily defensive weapons and tactics. But beginning in the 70s American police administrators, whether honestly or to enhance their own political positions, began to report a new kind of criminal activity that required a more militarized response. This was Urban Terrorism. First from radicals like the Black Panthers, then the armed anti-war organizations such as the Weathermen, the right-wing Militias, religious and political loonies, the drug cartels, and finally the jihadists. All these folk appeared ready to advance their causes by slaughtering people who are not party to their grievances. It was against these that Special Weapons And Tactics were devised.
The Philippine police situation then was very different. Our national police was ALREADY PARAMILITARY, in fact a branch of the armed forces where Special Forces equipment and training were issued. Still, our Marcos-era politicians jumped on the SWAT bandwagon enthusiastically, for different reasons.
The 3 politicians who controlled our armed personnel began consolidating elite troops and special equipment around themselves, probably as insurance against each other. Marcos had the Presidential Security Command as the Imperial Guard. The PSC was Ilocano, and officered by loyalists, mostly University of the Philippines ROTC, including rather lousy schoolmates surnamed *****, ******, etc. Friend Gerrie Barangan’s dad, Santiago Barangan, was later commander there. What’s more our UP ROTC had a formidable contingent in the Malacañang technocratic brainthrust, led by Boy Morales, Eddie Soliman, Mat Defensor, Ding Navarro, Teddy Rey, etc.
Enrile’s MND had a handpicked cadre from the top graduates of the PMA. Ramos, having been spurned as Army Chief and installed only as PC chief, quietly created his own Praetorians: the PNP Special Action Force. I believe Marcos, through Ver also controlled their choice of Regional Police forces, the most important of which was Metro Manila, policed by the METRODISCOM. The best people and officers in these units functioned as Special Ops, SWAT.
With some notable exceptions, the METRODISCOM officers were battle tested in Mindanao. It had American-trained units commanded by young lieutenants fresh from the PMA, and their baptism of fire against the Moro, including units under friends Felix Angue and Sam Tucay. Most members of these units were paratroopers, divers, certified firearms experts, snipers, pistol fighters. It was they that performed those incredible feats that form part of the local, secret Special Operations lore: the rescue of hundreds of kidnap victims and hostages including the heiress ****** ********, the rescue of the American finance man ****** and the simultaneous neutralization of a number of the kidnappers’ safe houses, leaving all perpetrators dead. All perps dead.
At Cawa-cawa in your home town of Zamboanga, Sammy Tucay’s LRU failed to rescue that general held by Rizal Alih, but that was because the grandstanding generals performing for the newly freed media, specially live TV, messed the operations up. Still, LRU showed exceptional bravery: commanded to attack the fortified second floor, never mind that Alih knew from media that they were coming, they stormed up and were shot to pieces. On live TV I saw how, when finally stretchered out, their wounded refused to give up their rifles to the Red Cross, insisting on being armed on the way to the hospital. I am proud to say these men, specially the valiant five who reached the second floor and halfway down the hall where Alih was – with whom I still shoot, drink, and share time and stories - are good friends of mine to this day.
From newspaper accounts, I gather there were 4 SWAT units available to assault the hostage bus at the Luneta:
1. The PNP Special Action Force
2. The Regional Mobile Group (RMG), with the LRU, commanded by friend and teammate **** ******
3. The so-called Super SWAT of the MPD, commanded by **** ** ** ****, former LRU, US trained.
4. The MPD SWAT under Pascual: The least trained of all.
Predictably the clowns in command chose to use the MPD SWAT.
As friend Mon Tulfo says, it is all politics. Mon and his firearms instructor Philip Manlapaz were practicing one-shot to the A from an inside-the-pants-holster under an Americana suit. We agreed. The incompetent new generals brought in by the Aquino people stuck to the bata-bata system and chose their own incompetents to do the job the other units could do better.
This is of course the gripe of old friend Felix Angue, whose political naivete Tulfo mocked, but whose personal integrity, competence and courage no one, not even his political enemies, dares challenge. Pushed by Recah Trinidad, Mon Tulfo and the Inquirer championed Felix when, in 1990, as Zamboanga SWOG, he corralled a whole fucking fleet of smuggling boats in a cove and refused their release, as demanded by the powerful. Our friend, the late and fondly missed Fernando Poe Jr enlisted Vice President Joseph Estrada’s help then ( I remember Felix and I checking our pistols with Erap’s security at the Polk Street mansion), and then again when Felix – allegedly restricted by orders from firing on Chinese naval troops disguised as fishermen in the Spratleys –rammed the Chinese boat and sank it. Or this elaboration may be part of Special Ops legend.
What is indisputable is that Special Ops people seem to find it specially difficult to transition into politics. Witness McChrystal. Leaders should, if they had any sense, beware of choosing the malleable, comfortable, unobtrusive subordinate where the evident requirement is for something, someone clearer, fiercer and more dangerous, and whose dedication is only to the mission at hand.
Sincerely, Erwin
